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In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
KNITGOOD WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 155, UNITE
AFL-CIO,
Union,
-andCRYSTAL ART CORPORATION AND WORKPROS, INC.,
Employer.

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the Union:
Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure P.C.
By: Thomas M. Kennedy, Esq .
and Ursula Levelt, Esq .
113 University Place, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10003
-andLeila Maldonado, Esq.
60 East 42nd Street, Suite 1736
New York, NY 10165
For the Employer:
Kaufman, Schneider & Bianco, LLP
By: Arthur R. Kaufman, Esq.
and Thomas J. Bianco, Esq.
390 North Broadway
Jericho, NY 11753

FACTS

In November 2001, I issued an Opinion and Award in the captioned dispute in which I found
that Crystal Art Corporation (Crystal) and Workpros, Inc. (Workpros) violated a successorship clause in
Article 24 of the 1999-2002 collective bargaining agreement with Knitgood Workers' Union, Local 155,
UNITE, AFL-CIO (Local 155 or Union). The basis for the determination was Crystal's transfer of work,
accounts receivable, equipment, supplies, customers and former Crystal employees and supervisors to
Chardan, Inc. d/b/a Perfect Art

(Perfect).

Crystal, Workpros and Perfect1 were held jointly and

separately liable for damages caused by that contract violation to the employees in the unit Local 155 had
represented at Crystal and to Local 155 itself. The employees who were laid off or otherwise terminated
because of the improper transfer of work from Crystal to Perfect were to be paid wages and benefits lost.
The Union was to be reimbursed for Health Fund contributions. Lost dues were to be paid pursuant to the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. As the exact dollar amount of these damages could not be
determined, the parties were ordered to negotiate regarding the amount of any damages owed.
Jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of fixing a dollar amount of damages if the parties were unable
to agree upon the damages to be paid pursuant to my Opinion and Award.
When the parties could not agree upon an amount to be paid, the record on damages was
reopened pursuant to my retention of jurisdiction. Hearings were held on nine days between September
20022 and January 2003 at which Local 155 and Crystal were represented by counsel3 who were afforded
a full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The
Arbitrator's Oath was waived. Counsels have filed very extensive legal memoranda both pre-hearing and
post-hearing with replies. The Arbitrator's oath was waived
Introduced into evidence as part of the record of this arbitration and thus within my jurisdiction
for consideration is the settlement decision of the NLRB setting forth its resolution of the unfair labor
practice charge filed by the Union against the Employer for the Employer's action in transferring

1 1 concluded that

the collective bargaining agreement was binding on Perfect.
The September hearing was not transcribed.
3 Perfect declined to participate in the hearings.
2

bargaining unit work to Perfect Art ~ the same transaction involved in the breach of contract action in
this arbitration and in my prior arbitration Award.
The NLRB determined damages for the statutory violation as follows:
Loss of dues

$10,720.00

Health Fund Payments

$53,650.00

Wages/Back Pay

$75,680.00

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Union

Damages to employees should be calculated using as a base line the 33 employees Perfect
employed in September 1999, the month in which it is fair to conclude that transfers to Perfect began.
The amount of work transferred from Crystal to Perfect in violation of the contract is fairly represented
by the number of employees above 33 that Perfect employed at any time after November 1, 1999 when
Crystal ceased its New York Operations. Using average hourly wage rates and employee months of
Perfect's performance of Crystal work yields a back wage sum, including overtime, of $1,105,205. With
the appropriate offsets, including mitigation, back wages total $368,085 plus interest of $72,773 for a
total of $440,858. The Union should be paid comparably for Health Fund contributions and lost dues.
The Union has satisfied its burden of proof because the amount of damages can be ascertained
upon the evidence of record. As part of the Arbitrator's broad authority to fashion the appropriate
remedies for contract violations, there should be a general fund created from which the Union, subject to
its statutory duty of fair representation, would distribute monies to the employees who could have
continued working for Crystal but for the transfer of work to Perfect.
The NLRB settlement reached in September 2002 does not bar the Union from seeking damages
for a contract violation because it was not a signatory to that agreement, the issues in the unfair labor
practice proceeding and the contract are different, and the settlement agreement is inadequate and flawed.
The Employer's allegation that certain former employees of Crystal are undocumented aliens has
no relevance to the contract remedies.

The waivers executed by employees upon receipt of severance payments are void because they
were fraudulently induced by misrepresentations that Crystal was ceasing its New York operations and
sending its work either out of state or out of the country.
EMPLOYER
Any damages award must be consistent with the original award in November 2001 that
contemplates traditional relief and is the "Law of the Case." Those traditional remedial considerations
limit any award to the ten employees who testified, require a recognition of mitigation and offset
principles, which include a credit for unemployment insurance benefits received, must exclude those
employees who signed valid and subsequently ratified releases after accepting severance pay and must
not reward any undocumented aliens. Applying these principles, no damages are owed.
There is no basis in the original opinion for an award of any damages to the Union other than
dues and no dues can be ordered paid because the record does not disclose which employees, if any,
signed dues deduction authorizations as required by law and contract. Even if welfare fund contributions
can be ordered, those contributions must be limited to the ten employees who testified.
The Union's positions are contrary to the Arbitrator's dictates because it uses employee levels at
Perfect before Crystal closed in November 1999, it requests class relief and it relies on an allegedly
"representative" sampling of employees which is not shown to be representative.
OPINION
As the summary of the parties' positions only begins to reveal, the damages component of this
dispute involves a great many contested and complex factual and legal issues. For reasons discussed
next, I believe that the NLRB settlement of unfair labor practice charges which had been filed by Local
155 provides the principal disposition of the damage issues raised by this dispute, with an "additional
factor" as explained later.
Lest the Union believe that in doing so I am abdicating my arbitrator's role, let me assert that my
decision is based on substantive as well as procedural grounds. Indeed, in addition to the procedural
propriety of reciprocal deferral, a substantive comparison of the Union's case in the arbitration and the

outcome of the NLRB investigation on the same issues does not show that the former exceeds the latter
either in scope, or liability of the Employer(s), except for the "additional factor" supra.
I fully recognize that the function and agenda of the NLRB and an arbitrator are indeed different,
as the Union points out in its arguments. Notwithstanding those differences, the NLRB has for many
years, under its Spielberg.4 Dubo5 and Collyer6 deferral policies, routinely yielded its jurisdiction to the
private forum in recognition that arbitration either has or may resolve the statutory dispute in a manner
that is consistent with federal labor law. Similarly, the different roles performed by the NLRB and an
arbitrator, and the differences in the issues being presented, do not by themselves provide a basis for an
arbitrator to disregard developments that occur in the resolution of statutory claims anymore than they
provide a basis for the NLRB to disregard developments that occur in the disposition of the contract
claims. In appropriate circumstances, there are as many reasons supporting an arbitrator's deferral to
statutory processes as there are for a labor agency's deferral to contractual grievance arbitration. The
question, therefore, is not whether there can be arbitral deferral or partial deferral to statutory processes,
but whether, factually, the circumstances for such deferral are appropriate. I find they are, as far as they
go.
First to be considered in answering that question are the reasons advanced by Local 155 for not
accepting the NLRB settlement as a fair and reasonable disposition of the damage claims raised in this
proceeding.
The NLRB settlement by its very terms was of the unfair labor practice charges only and not of
"any other case(s) or matters." Those charges were the only matters, which could have been settled by
the NLRB as they were the only matters within its jurisdiction. But nonetheless the issue here is whether
the damages assessed by the NLRB fairly adequately and substantially remedy the contract violation
raised in this proceeding and are not exceeded by the evidence in the arbitration.
Local 155 also argues that it was not a party to the settlement agreement and, therefore, the
agreement cannot bind it. Local 155 declined to enter into the agreement. In similar vein Local 155

' Spielberg. Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 36LRRM 1152 (1955).
5
6

Dubo Mfg. Co.. 142 NLRB 431, 53 LRRM 1070.
Collver Insulated Wire 192 NLRB 837 77 LRRM 1931 (1971) (1963).

declined to appeal the settlement despite notice of its rights in that respect. Local 155's arguments also
do not address the real issue. The issue is not whether the settlement agreement is binding upon Local
155. The issue is what effect, if any, the Arbitrator should give to the determinations that are reflected in
that agreement. That is an issue to be determined according to the evidentiary soundness, the fairness and
reasonableness of those administrative proceedings, not whether the agreement is "binding" upon anyone.
My review of the NLRB's correspondence and documents persuades me that the NLRB's officials
were fully aware of the damage issues. Moreover, Local 155 concedes that "the remedy requested by the
Union in the [grievance] closely parallels the relief set forth in the NLRB settlement agreement." Indeed,
Local 155 admits that "the Board settlement affords the Union and its members some compensation for
dues, lost health funds and wages...." (emphasis added) By admission, and otherwise from the evidence
of record, it is clear that the damage issues and the facts relevant to the disposition of those damage issues
are the same in the grievance as they were in unfair labor practice proceedings, plus the "additional
factor" supra.
The Union argues that the NLRB settlement is "too limited, inadequate and premised on spurious
information." But this argument stems more from the result finally reached than from the methodology
employed by the NLRB. For example, the Union is dissatisfied that the NLRB ultimately agreed to
use October 1999 as the base month for its damage calculations and not September 1999 as the
Union proposes. It is displeased that the NLRB used 44 Perfect employees as the base number rather
than the 33 the Union proposes I adopt. It disagrees with the formula used by the NLRB, which was
based on only % of the excess work at Perfect and not the entire amount of the increase in Perfect's work
after Crystal closed.
To further support is arguments about the unfairness of the NLRB's approach, the Union
submitted with its post-hearing brief a May 2002 letter from the NLRB's General Counsel's office that
pre-dated the September 2002 settlement agreement. This letter was not in evidence. The Union
argues that this letter was only recently disclosed to it and that I may, in any event, take notice of
the correspondence.

The Employer objects to my consideration of this document, which it

alleges is but one of a readily available series of letters exchanged between the NLRB and the
Employer's attorney.
The Union submits this May 2002 letter because the NLRB's damage calculations
mentioned in that May 2002 letter were more favorable to the Union and its members than were
the means and measure of damages contained in the September 2002 settlement agreement.
I need not resolve the issue of the admissibility of this document. For even if I were to consider
the May 2002 letter, it would not support a conclusion that the NLRB's investigation of the facts was
inadequate, that its methodology was flawed, or that its final determinations as reflected in the settlement
agreement were inaccurate. As this record reveals, and as I have already mentioned, there are no
absolutes in this situation, only reasoned arguments giving rise to substantial differences of opinion as to
the proper approach and correct result. The Union, for example, recognizes that it "is not always possible
to pinpoint who the individual employees are who were injured by the subcontracting." The same truism
applies to the measure of damages owed them or the Union itself. As this case well proves, it is often
simply not possible to "pinpoint" the amount of damages despite the volume of evidence produced.
The NLRB defers to arbitration when the arbitrator's award as rendered is based on due process
and not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Arbitrators defer to
Awards of prior arbitrators on the same issues if not "palpably wrong." Courts similarly defer to
arbitrator's awards unless they are in manifest disregard of the law, conflict with clear and compelling
public policy or violate statutory standards. The Arbitrator's deferral to the NLRB's determination may
similarly result when that administrative determination is not palpably wrong, not repugnant to the
purpose and policies of the parties' collective bargaining agreement or to the grievance arbitration
process and when the NLRB determinations are sound as a matter of fact and law. Although one might
be able to debate whether the NLRB's determination was correct upon some standard, nothing of record
suggests that the settlement was repugnant to these parties' collective bargaining agreement or palpably
wrong. To the extent its final calculations as reflected in the September 2002 settlement agreement differ
from its initial calculations made in May 2002, shows only an evidentiary and/or factual change in

reaching a final determination to make the employees and the Union "whole, with interest." There is no
evidence of arbitrariness.
The evidence before me supports only the conclusion that the NLRB came to a reasonable
damages conclusion after reviewing the relevant evidence at some length and in considerable detail. That
settlement reflects a finding with respect to each of the several issues that are presented to me under the
backpay, health fund and union dues claims. The NLRB settlement fixes the base line month, the base
number of Perfect employees, including transfers from Crystal, average monthly wages, monthly health
fund contribution, and dues checkoff amounts. The record before me shows that the Board conducted an
intensive investigation that incorporates resolution of issues pertaining to mitigation of damages and
credits for monies paid to or received by employees.

The investigation conducted by the NLRB's

General Counsel's office was also approved by the NLRB's Regional Director.
In short, I find a presumption of regularity and fairness accorded the NLRB's resolution of
damages as far as it goes, which I do not believe has been rebutted in this case.
As the Employer correctly observes, my original award was in "traditional" form.
emphasized that point during the hearing on damages.

I re-

I ordered payment of wages, health fund

contributions and dues that were lost as a result of the contract violation that was found. Each of those
categories of damage is addressed in the NLRB settlement.
The formula for determining the base number of employees, which in turn was used by the NLRB
to calculate the amounts in all categories of damages, is consistent with conclusions in my original award.
In my original award, I rejected both Local 155's argument that all subcontracting by Crystal to Perfect
was prohibited by the contract and the Employer's argument that subcontracting to Perfect was entirely
unrestrained. I concluded that Crystal and Perfect were not liable for the totality of the losses suffered by
either the employees or the Union. The damages were to reflect the losses occasioned by the transfer of
work in violation of Article 24. The NLRB's calculations were based upon % of the excess of the base
number of Perfect employees (58 total), a number which it then converted into a number of employee
"slots."

I recognize and appreciate the difficulty the Union faced in attempting to fix damages for a
larger group of employees than the fewer number who testified. And similar evidentiary difficulty in
showing the number of employees to be included in the liability calculation and the beginning date of
liability. The point is that these matters were duly considered by the Board and the evidence on these
items in this arbitration, limited to the testimony of some of the employees and the extrapolations argued
there from are frankly no better than the results of the extensive inquiry by the Board on these same
matters.
Having said all that, what remains is the "additional factor," previously referred to. As it was
clearly an argument of the Union herein, I considered it of substantial significance and part of lost wages
to warrant a substantive assessment and an additional compensatory remedy.
Uniquely, in this case, my jurisdiction encompasses two Employer violations — the contract
breach and the statutory violation of the duty to bargain. Though I have adopted the NLRB settlement as
a principal bases for resolution of the contract issues, I am not satisfied that the remedy for one violation
is totally enough for both, especially where, as here, I conclude that the contractual violation was willful.
More specifically, I believe that the wage/back pay damages portion of the NLRB settlement, directed to
the statutory breach, is not fully adequate as a contractual remedy because I do not think it took into full
account the "additional fact" of the future loss of Union protection, loss of union standards and benefits,
and the loss of active Union membership of and for those employees who lost their employment as a
direct result of the wrongful transfer of work. Indeed, I make one extrapolation from the testimony of the
employees and that is that for them and others similarly situated, it is highly improbable that they will be
able again to find Union covered jobs. And from that they will suffer future wage losses.
These particular losses are contractual, not statutory. They are significant and compensatory,
though not precisely measurable, but still within "traditional damages." And I conclude that those losses
are of a compensatory equal to the statutory wage losses found by the NLRB.
Accordingly, under my authority to fashion a remedy I shall treat them as "liquidated damage"
and shall add an additional $60,000 to the Employer's liability. Said additional amount shall be deemed
additional wage/back pay damages.

The final question is how to incorporate the foregoing into any award in this case.

The

settlement agreement is not now enforceable by Local 155. The enforcement of that agreement is by and
within the NLRB. To provide Local 155 a means to enforce its and its members' contractual rights, I will
issue an award incorporating by express reference the terms of the NLRB settlement plus an additional
increase in wage damages. It should be made clear that monies owed by the Employer are to be paid
from the account established under the settlement agreement plus an additional $60,000 to be paid
directly.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and having clearly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties make the following AWARD:
Crystal Art Corporation and Workpros Inc. shall jointly and severally pay damages to Local 155
and the former employees of Crystal in the amounts and in the manner prescribed in a settlement
agreement of September 18, 2002 in conjunction with National Labor Relations Board Case Numbers 29CA-23325 and 29-CA-23341 captioned G.R.D.G., Inc., A.M. &N, Inc. d/b/a Crystal Art Gallery, Crystal
Art Corp and Chardan, Inc., d/b/a Perfect Art Line, a single employer.
Therefore Crystal Art Corporation and Workpros Inc. shall pay to Local 155 from the funds
appropriated thereunder and for the purposes set forth therein the following sums:
Dues

$10,720.00

Health Fund

$53,600.00

Wages/Back Pay

$75,680.00

In addition, said Employer shall pay directly to Local 155 the additional sum of $60,000 which
shall be deemed additional wage/back pay damages, to be distributed as such to the affected employees.
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This Award shall apply equally to Perfect Art whom I found in my earlier Award to be bound by
the collective bargaining agreement.
Eric J. Sdifhertz, Arbitrator
DATED: June 27, 2003
STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in
and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 IBEW
Case #133000296202

-andTHE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY
-X

The above-named parties could not agree on a jointly
stipulated issue.
The
Authority

Union,

as

the

grieving

party

claims

that

the

(Employer) "breached Article XV 19 and Article XXI by

"changing its Comp Time policy by requiring employees to bank
their comp time weekly in lien of banking the overtime daily."
The Employer denies any contract breach.
Hearings were held on March 24th and April 29, 2003 at
which time representatives of the Union and the Employer appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine

and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived, a stenographic record of the hearings was taken
and both sides filed post-hearing briefs, and reply statements.

Article XV 19 reads in pertinent part:
9.

Compensatory Time

The present practice concerning compensatory
time shall continue.
The maximum number of
overtime hours which can be banked by an
employee in the covered membership shall be
200 and such hours will be limited to those
hours actually worked in excess of 40 in a
seven consecutive day period.
Article XXI reads:
XXI.

PAST PRACTICE - PROTECTION OF EXISING
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

1.

Unless a contrary intent is specifically
expressed
in
this
Memorandum
of
Agreement, all practices, procedures and
policies governing existing terms and
conditions of employment of employees in
the covered membership which are not
specifically enumerated or set forth in
this Memorandum of Agreement, shall be
maintained at not less than the highest
standards in effect at the time of
execution of this Memorandum of Agreement
and, during the term of this Memorandum
of
Agreement,
any
such
practice,
procedure or policy pursuant to statute
or otherwise and governing an existing
term and condition of employment shall
not be limited, restricted, impaired,
removed or abolished unilaterally.

2.

A charge or complaint that the Authority
has unilaterally
limited,
restricted,
impaired, removed or abolished such a
practice, procedure or policy governing
an
existing
term
and
condition
of
employment which is not specifically
enumerated
or
set
forth
in
this
Memorandum of Agreement shall not be
subject to or processed
through the
grievance-arbitration procedure referred
to in Exhibit "D" of this Memorandum of
Agreement.

I do not see the applicability of Article XXI.

That

section protects "existing terms and conditions of employment...
which

are

not

Memorandum

specifically

enumerated

or

set

forth

in

the

of Agreement" and prohibits resort to the grievance

procedure of an Employer change in a "practice, procedure or
policy...not

enumerated

or

set

forth

in

this Memorandum..."

(emphasis added)
The fact is that the subject of the dispute in this
case is set forth in the Memorandum, specifically in Article XV
59.

As

recited

above,

that

contract

provision

deals

with

Compensatory Time and the "banking" of overtime hours.
So, only Article XV 19 is relevant to this case.
As to that the Union claims that the "present practice"
concerning

compensatory

time "is and has been to permit the

banking of overtime on a daily basis," and that the Employer has
improperly changed that practice to limit banking of overtime
only on a weekly basis.
The Employer denies that the "present practice" has
been to bank overtime daily.
timekeepers

have allowed

While it acknowledges that some

the banking

of overtime on a daily

basis, it was done in error and without authority; that most of
the timekeepers regularly banked employee overtime on a weekly
basis;

and

that

when

the

Employer

directed

those

timekeepers who did it on a daily basis to change to a weekly
basis, it was a return to the proper practice, consistent with
the contract.
For two well-settled arbitral principles, I need not
resolve the disagreement over what has been or is the "present
practice."
The first is that specific contract language pre-empts
general contract language when both may be related to the same
subject matter.

The second is that clear, unambiguous

contract

language takes precedent over any past practice to the contrary.
And

that only where the practice has been of long duration,

unvaried and mutually agreed to or followed can it be construed
as an enforceable contract change from the written agreement.
Article XV

19

is general in its

first

sentence by

providing that "present practice" was to continue.
all

there

was

to

that

provision,

it would

be

If that was
necessary

to

determine the "practice" to resolve that disagreement.
But

the

second

sentence

relates to the dispute herein.

is

specific

and

expressly

It states that:

"The maximum number of overtime hours which
can be banked by an employee. .. shall be 200
and such hours will be limited to those hours
actually worked in excess of 40 in a seven
consecutive day period." (emphasis added)

Applying

the

foregoing

well-settled

principles,

the

specific second sentence clarifies and pre-empts the first.

And

the second sentence is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to take
contractual precedent over any practice to the contrary.
Clearly, and unambiguously, the foregoing underscored
language of Article XV 19 provides that the overtime that may be
banked
seven

is that cumulative
consecutive

amount worked beyond

40 hours

day period or in other words,

in a

on a weekly

basis.
If
compensation

overtime

is banked

daily

it

could

result

in

a

benefit before 40 regular hours were worked, and

even where less than 40 regular hours had been worked within the
seven consecutive days.
For

example,

if

an

employee

works

overtime

(i.e.

beyond 8 hours) on days 1, 2 and 3 of a particular week, but does
not work the balance of that week, thereby not meeting the 40
hour threshold, that employee would get overtime banked short of
or in the absence of working 40 regular hours.

As I view it,

that result is not contemplated by Article XV 119.
Finally,
overtime

banking

employees

and/or

that
and

some

reached

Union

timekeepers
agreements

representatives

to
was

permitted
do
not

so

daily

with

of

some

such

an

unvaried nature, not sufficiently uniform of or of sufficient
longevity,

authority

or

consent

to

mutually

meet

American Arbitration Association,
Administrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 1177, AFL-CIO,
Union,
-and -

AAA Case No.
133000235202

PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY
Employer.

Appearances:

For the Employer.
Patrick D. Rooney
Chief, Employment & Labor Law Division
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
225 Park Avenue South, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10003
By Richard D. Williams, Esq.
For the Union:
Amy S. Young, Esq.
Semel, Young & Norum
275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2300
New York, NY 10001

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Separate unresolved grievances (PA 2001-02 and PA 2002-01) were submitted by
the Communications Workers of America, Local 1177, AFL-CIO (CWA or Union) and
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA, Authority or Employer) for
disposition by arbitration pursuant to the terms of the parties 1995-2000 collective
bargaining agreement (CBA or Agreement).
Hearings were held before the appointed Arbitrator on February 13, March 17 and
April 11, 2003. A stenographic record was taken except for the hearing held on March
17. Those transcripts and the Arbitrator's notes, together with the documents that were
received into evidence, constitute the record for this opinion and award. The parties were
represented by counsel on all dates who were afforded the unrestricted opportunity to
examine witnesses and to submit evidence and argument in support of their respective
positions. There were no objections to the hearing. Counsel have each filed post-hearing
memoranda of law.

ISSUES
The parties stipulated the following issues at the first day of hearing:
1. Did the Authority violate the Agreement by contracting out work previously
performed by Network Control Operators (NCO) at the Help Desk as alleged in
the record of the grievance dated August 8, 2001 and/or January 11, 2002? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
2. After September 11, 2001, did the Authority violate the Agreement by having
the functions of check writing and data control for PATH and Port Authority

payroll duties performed by persons outside of the bargaining unit? If so, what
shall be the remedy9
3. Did the Authority violate the Agreement by causing site prep work at the
Newark Airport to be performed outside of the bargaining unit? If so, and if the
matter was not previously resolved, what shall be the remedy?
RELEVANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
XV Unit Work
During the term of this Memorandum of Agreement, unit
work currently and heretofore performed by employees in the
covered membership will continue to be performed by such
employees, so long as such work continues to be performed
by or on behalf of the Port Authority. The Port Authority will
not transfer and/or reassign such unit work to non-unit
personnel without negotiations with the CWA.

Such other provisions of the CB A that are relevant are cited and discussed in the
opinion.
SUMMARY OF PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
Union
The Authority has violated the clear terms of Article XV of the Agreement as
alleged in the grievances because the record establishes that the Authority subcontracted
and otherwise transferred various types of unit work to persons outside the unit. The
disposition of the grievances is controlled by the unambiguous language of the
Agreement, as was held in a prior arbitration proceeding involving the same parties, not
by the terms of the Port Authority Labor Relations Instruction (PA Instruction). Neither

technological advances, if any, nor efficiency considerations, nor job descriptions define
or limit the work which is preserved for performance by unit employees. The protections
of Article XV run to work actually performed by unit employees, a task oriented, practice
oriented examination. All of the work claimed by the Union for unit employees has been
done by unit employees and it is now being done by persons not in the unit. The effect of
those transfers of unit work is not in any respect de minimus and in no respect has there
been any agreement reached to settle any grievance.
Employer
The grievances must be denied because the Union did not prove a transfer of unit
work in violation of Article XV in respect to any grievance. The grievances are about the
"unknown" and supported by inconclusive evidence, at best.
Article XV must be interpreted in light of the PA Instruction. As such, "unit
work" principles established by the labor agency that administers the Instruction are
relevant and instructive. The Union's grievances attempt to convert Article XV from a
"work preservation" clause into a work acquisition clause. Any decrease in unit
employees' workload has not been shown to have been caused by a transfer of work
outside the unit. The admitted violation of Article XV presented by the limited transfer
of unit work at the Newark Airport has been remedied by agreement.

OPINION
The Meaning and Application of Article XV
Before addressing the merits of each particular grievance, it is necessary and
appropriate to consider the parties' broader arguments concerning the proper framework
for an analysis of Article XV.
First to consider is the Authority's argument that the words "unit work" as they
appear in Article XV can have only the meaning given that phrase under decisions
rendered by the Port Authority Employment Relations Panel (Panel).
The argument advanced by the Authority was rejected by Arbitrator Robert Light
in an earlier arbitration award involving these parties. He concluded that the unit work
concepts used by the Panel in deciding whether and when a transfer of unit work is a
mandatoiy subject of negotiation under the Instruction are not relevant in determining the
meaning of the parties' Agreements. I concur.
The Panel is essentially a labor relations administrative agency that is responsible
for the application of the PA Instruction. That Instruction is roughly the equivalent of a
public sector labor relations statute which permits and requires the negotiations that led
the parties to their Agreement. It is the terms of that Agreement, not the Instruction,
which govern the disposition of these contract grievances. Even assuming that the
Authority might not have been required to negotiate a work preservation clause under the
Instruction, it elected to do so, and having done so, the Authority made the contractual

terms the only relevant ones. That the Agreement is "entered into pursuant to and subject
to the provisions" of the Instruction does not mean that Article XV must be interpreted
only as the Panel defines unit work for purposes of making a negotiability analysis. The
Instruction is the mechanism for negotiations. Its terms are relevant to whether the
parties had an obligation to bargain a work preservation clause. It offers nothing,
however, to aid an interpretation concerning the parties' intent upon entering into the
language in Article XV.
The analysis would be somewhat different if the Instruction made a work
preservation clause a prohibited scope of bargaining such that any agreement to such a
clause might be void and unenforceable. The Authority makes no such argument and my
own reading of the Instruction does not support a conclusion that traditional work
preservation clauses which are a common term of public sector labor agreements are
prohibited subjects of bargaining.
The conclusion that the CBA and not the Instruction controls the disposition of
these grievances is made manifest by the Agreement itself which does not permit
grievances about claimed violations of the Instruction and limits the Arbitrator's power to
an interpretation of the CBA. If the Arbitrator were to disregard the actual language of
Article XV and read into what is plainly set forth there, an interpretation derived from
statute, he would be violating the terms of the parties' grievance procedure and exceeding
his powers thereunder.

In any event, the Authority's arguments about the application of the Instruction to
these grievances appear to be largely academic because its actual arguments are fact
based. The Authority's arguments assume, correctly, that a work preservation clause is at
least a permissive subject of negotiation about which it and CWA could and did bargain
to conclusion. It argues, therefore, that the Union is attempting by these grievances to
convert what is an enforceable work preservation clause into a work acquisition clause.
This argument about the negotiability of a work acquisition clause under the Instruction
is misdirected, however, because that is not the nature, purpose or the effect of Article
XV as next discussed.
There is no ambiguity in either the language of Article XV or any uncertainty
about the meaning of that provision. Article XV is simple enough. The parties have
agreed that work which was being done by employees in the bargaining unit represented
by CWA when the contract was entered into, or before, is unit work which the unit
employees have the contractual right to continue to perform. To give effect to that right,
the Authority has further agreed that it will not "transfer" or "reassign" that work to
"non-unit personnel" without negotiating such transfer or reassignment with the CWA.
The prohibition on the removal of unit work includes work which continues to be done
after transfer by the Authority itself and work done "on behalf of the Authority by
others. Thus, the unilateral "transfers" and "reassignments" of unit work prohibited by
Article XV clearly capture both traditional subcontracting arrangements under which
person(s) not employed by the Authority, or entities other than the Authority, perform the

unit work and circumstances in which the Authority reassigns the work to other persons
in its employ but who are not within the CWA's unit.
As noted, Article XV preserves for performance by unit employees only the work
which unit employees have actually done. Article XV does not capture for unit
employees new work which they have never performed. But for reasons discussed
hereafter, none of the work in issue under these grievances is new. The work which the
Authority transferred for performance by nonunit personnel is all work which has in fact
been performed by employees represented by the Union.
The Help Desk Grievances
The grievance dated August 3, 2001 alleges that the Authority violated the
Agreement by allowing and encouraging persons requiring the services of the UNISYS
Corporation to stop using the NCOs at the Authority's Computer Help Desk as the point
of first contact. The grievance dated January 11, 2002 alleges that this "outsourcing" has
continued after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.
The work which the Union seeks to preserve for performance by its unit
employees as relevant to the Help Desk is described generally by the Union as follows:
Being first contact for staff computer problems, resolving
what could be resolved in the initial contact dispatching the
problem to the proper source, and tracking the problem to
resolution.
As applicable to the Authority's Engineering and Law Departments, the claimed unit
work is limited to "hardware" problems because the Union admits that "software"
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problems were handled internally within those two departments through a computer
liaison and not by Help Desk staff.
The duties and responsibilities of an NCO as contained in the job specification
attached to the parties' Agreement are as follows.
NCOs work at the Computer Operations Help Desk. Their basic function is to
respond to requests for assistance with problems and questions relating to computer
software and hardware and telecommunications systems. NCOs identify and analyze
problems and recommend solutions to those problems. Typical tasks include:
1. Answering questions by phone and providing solutions to
"1st level" problems posed by users of mainframe
computer systems
2. Analyze "2nd level" hardware and software problems under
physical inspection of the computer room
communications hardware
3. Monitor systems and lines to ensure proper operation
4. Date and record entry and tracking to close
5. Activate and deactivate users' terminals and printers
6. Perform supervisory functions on weekend.
These duties are illustrative and NCOs may perform any combination of duties or
related work at a comparable level of difficulty, including varied administrative tasks
related to Help Desk functions.
As described by Frank Gabay, an NCO and past vice-president of the Union,
NCOs were the first points of contact with computer related problems. Problems were

resolved by phone if possible and, if not referrals were made by the NCOs to the
appropriate persons. Records of calls were kept on an Information Management System
(IMS). Contacts, averaging between 180-250 per week were made by phone usually and
sometimes by e-mail or facsimile transmission. Follow up was done and there were case
tracking records maintained.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, NCOs were ordered home and
paid. NCOs returned to work on February 25, 2002, were located in a gymnasium, and
did only the resetting of SAP passwords. There were no or very few contacts regarding
computer problems from that date forward. Currently, the Help Desk averages 15-20
calls on a "busy week."
The clear weight of the record evidence establishes the accuracy of the Union's
description of the work done by unit employees. In its answer to the Help Desk
grievances, the Employer actually admits that the work the Union claims is, in fact, its
unit work. Although the question is somewhat closer as to the description of work within
the Engineering and Law Departments, I again find that the weight of the evidence
supports the accuracy of the Union's contention. In this regard, the persons in the unit
who were adversely affected are not unknown and the evidence in support of the
grievances is not "inconclusive." As described, this is the work that was, prior to the
events giving rise to the grievances, "heretofore performed by employees in the covered
membership" which "continues to be performed by or on behalf of the Port Authority" by
agents, officers or employees of UNISYS.
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The Employer's several defenses applicable to this particular dispute are not
persuasive.
The Employer argues that the unit work, at its broadest, is only response,
assistance and tracking of computer problems when and if a call to the Help Desk is made
by a user. From this, it argues that no violation of contract occurs if end users decline to
contact the PA Help Desk unless they have been directed or encouraged by the Employer
to bypass that point of first contact and there is not evidence to support that conclusion.
Although it may be true that the Authority did not issue a directive to users to circumvent
the Help Desk, the converse is equally true. The Employer undertook either no efforts to
prevent users from contacting the UNISYS Help Desk or it made little more than
ineffective "encouragements" to users to contact the PA Help Desk staff. The
Employer's argument wholly ignores the fact that it was the one who contracted with
UNISYS for a help desk system that made its own Help Desk largely, if not entirely,
redundant and unnecessary. It was the establishment of that separate service that is the
cause, wholly or substantially, for the substantial decline in the volume of contacts with
the Authority's NCOs. The UNISYS Help Desk has become the entity that serves as the
point of first contact for computer problems. Having created the mechanism that led to
the loss of the work the NCOs historically performed, the Authority cannot argue with
any degree of persuasiveness that it is not accountable for the use of the UNISYS system
simply because it did not specifically order or encourage employees to bypass the PA
Help Desk and the NCOs.

11

Moreover, I am persuaded that the Employer either created or condoned an
environment under which employees believed that it was permissible, if not desirable, for
them to bypass the NCOs and deal directly with UNISYS personnel. There may not have
been written instructions from the Employer to use UNISYS first, but nether was there,
despite the dramatic decline in the volume of NCO contacts, any effort by the Employer
to inform unit employees that first contact should be with the Help Desk staffed by the
NCOs. Condonation of a result that is flatly inconsistent with Article XV that is caused
indirectly by the Employer's action violates the provision as much as would a removal of
unit work effected more directly. That which the Authority is prevented from doing
directly cannot be accomplished by actions it has taken indirectly.
The Authority also argues that the work which is preserved by Article XV is only
that which is identified in the NCOs' job description. This argument must also be
rejected.
Article XV preserves for performance by unit employees the work that they have
actually done. As the Union correctly submits, it is practice which defines the work
preserved for the unit. NCOs have been the point of first contact for persons with
computer problems despite the advance in computer technology from mainframe to PCs.
The work preserved by Article XV captures that technological advance as and to the
extent unit employees' work has changed to keep pace with the science. Moreover, and
as the Union correctly observes, the terms of the job descriptions themselves are flexible
and expansive as they specially permit and require NCOs to perform related duties.
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The Employer argues further that technological advances have caused the
reduction in work activity suffered by the NCOs. It submits that the move to personal
computers and software packages have enabled users to fix many problems themselves
with or without resort to the "plethora of other places to get user information." This
argument is also not persuasive.
The Employer would have me conclude that it was technological advance, not the
UNISYS Help Desk, that caused the sharp decline in calls placed to the Help Desk. But
those technological advances predated the Employer's contract with UNISYS and the
Help Desk still had a much larger volume and variety of work than it has had since the
UNISYS Help Desk was opened. Technological advance may have caused the erosion of
some unit work, but that advance in science simply cannot explain most of the work that
was lost. UNISYS has taken over that work with the Employer's full consent and
cooperation. Indeed, but for the Employer's contract with UNISYS, that alternative
support system would not even exist. The Employer cannot disavow the inevitable
consequences of its own action.
When on notice of the Union's meritorious claim that work at the Help Desk was
being lost to UNISYS, it was incumbent upon the Employer to affirmatively prevent the
transfer of that work. That required a notice to employees that they were to contact the
PA Help Desk if they required assistance with computer problems. Its defense that what
happened was not its fault cannot be accepted if Article XV is to have any real meaning.
The absence of evidence that the Employer expressly directed its employees to use the
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UNISYS Help Desk, except for a time proximate to the terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, does not warrant or require a conclusion that the
grievances pertaining to the PA Help Desk must be dismissed. The actions taken and not
taken by the Employer caused a transfer of unit work in violation of Article XV.
Although the Union seeks a monetary remedy for the grievances pertaining to the
Help Desk, that is not appropriate. The NCOs have been paid for the work performed
and not performed. There is nothing to establish that the decrease in the volume of
contacts caused a loss of overtime opportunities. As I am not persuaded that there is a
cause and effect relationship between a decrease in the volume of contacts and a loss of
overtime, an order requiring NCOs be paid above and beyond that which they have
already been paid is not necessary or appropriate to remedy a violation of contract
premised upon a decrease in the volume of first contacts handled.
Payroll Functions Grievance
The grievance filed January 11, 2002 alleges that PATH payroll check writing and
data control functions previously done by unit employees were transferred for
performance by other Authority employees after September 11, 2001..
The Employer argues that this grievance must be dismissed because CWA did not
prove that nonunit personnel are doing payroll functions or other work that used to be
done by unit employees. It argues that the Union's evidence in support of this grievance
is "replete with uncertainty and unknowns," whereas the evidence in support of its
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contention that payroll functions that have been done by unit employees are still being
done by them was not rebutted by the Union.
The work the Union claims in this respect is described as:
submitting all payroll jobs, including special runs, advance
checks, and the resubmission of abends1

In this respect, the record shows generally that unit employees prepare data and
submit "jobs" through computer systems for PATH and PA weekly payroll and billings.
Until September 11, 2001, they also did special payrolls such as advance checks and
special payments. Unit employees still do weekly payroll, but since September 11, 2001,
they do not do any special payrolls. The allegation is that those functions have been
taken over by nonunit employees in the PA's Comptroller's Department. Union
witnesses, however, did not know whether these functions were still being performed by
or on behalf of the Authority or, if so, by whom. They knew only that they no longer did
special payrolls. What evidence there is in support of this allegation came mostly from
witnesses for the Employer.
William Percherski, the Payroll Manager within the Comptroller's office testified
that nonunit employees in his unit:
"prepare a pay sheet, calc it, confirm it and run it through pay
processing and generate a check"....

1

Abends are failures in automated programs.
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The Union also alleges that unit employees are responsible for handling automated
jobs when they "abend" (i.e. fail). When a job abends it must be resubmitted and the
record shows that nonunit employees did, albeit to a veiy limited extent resubmit some
abends. The record also shows that system users outside the unit submit payroll "jobs"
from time to time.
The weight of the evidence shows that data control work previously done by unit
employees is now being done by persons outside the unit. Similarly to Arbitrator Light's
award in the prior proceeding, this violated Article XV. Technological advances that
permit other persons to do this work, even if they do it more quickly and more efficiently
than do unit employees, do not permit either the intentional or unintentional transfer of
tasks and duties performed historically by unit employees. The clear terms of Article XV
do not permit for the consideration of such alleged efficiencies. Relief from the strictures
of Article XV must come from modifications to language secured in collective
bargaining, not from interpretation of language at arbitration.
Although the amount of payroll and data control work transferred from the unit is
not large in amount, that does not make this a case for application of a de minimus
.-^

principle that is sometimes applied to deny otherwise meritorious grievances. The
amount of work involved may be relatively small in comparison, for example, to the loss
of the NCOs' work at the Help Desk, but the loss is identifiable and continuing despite
the availability of unit employees to perform the at-issue payroll functions.
See Elkouri and Elkouri How Arbitration Works (5th cd. 1997) at 588-89.
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Site Prep Work At Newark Airport
CWA alleges in this grievance that certain site prep functions, including "punch
downs" and work station preparations at the Newark Airport, were performed by nonunit
persons.
The parties stipulated at the hearing that the Authority allowed site prep work at
the Newark Airport to be performed by nonunit persons in or around September-October
2001. They also stipulated that five unit employees were paid sixteen hours of pay at an
overtime rate for the work that was done by others at the Newark Airport.
The Authority has admitted that the work performed at the Newark Airport
violated the Agreement. It argues, however, that the monetary payments it made to the
five employees is a sufficient remedy, such that any further monetary payment is not
appropriate. Rather, a cease and desist remedy is all that is appropriate.
CWA argues that it never settled this grievance, never agreed to the monies paid to
these employees, indeed that it did not even know about the payments until it began to
prepare for the arbitration. In addition to a cease and desist order, which would include
an order prohibiting the Employer from dealing directly with employees, CWA asks that
a PA employee, who is also a union officer, be afforded a thirty day period within which
the employee would be given paid release time to investigate whether the Employer had
removed any other site prep work from the unit after the grievance was filed. It asks that
the Arbitrator retain jurisdiction until that investigation is completed.
17

This glievance was filed by CWA on behalf of all unit employees. It was not filed
by or on behalf of any particular employee or group of employees. This being CWA's
grievance, only CWA could settle it and it is clear from this record that the Union never
settled this grievance. Therefore, and notwithstanding the payment of certain monies to
the five employees, the glievance cannot be considered resolved. The Agreement having
been admittedly violated, the only issue remaining is what remedy is appropriate.
Both parties agree that a cease and desist remedy is minimally appropriate and I
have awarded that relief.
CWA's request for a thirty-day period to investigate whether the Employer
transferred unit work at the Airport in violation of the Agreement and, if so, what work,
is granted. I am persuaded that the full extent of transfers of unit work at the Airport
could not have been discovered by the Union before it filed the at-issue grievance.
Indeed, there appears to have been some effort by agents of the Employer to keep the
Union unaware of transfers of this work. The release time ordered is only that reasonably
necessary for the specific and limited purpose of conducting this investigation. If CWA
concludes after investigation that there are or were other transfers of unit work at the
Newark Airport in violation of the Agreement, it may file separate grievances pertaining
to those transfers in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. The grievance before
me challenges only certain transfers that occurred before the date of the grievance. That
grievance does not permit a retention of jurisdiction to determine whether different
alleged transfers of unit work violated the Agreement.
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AWARD
The Authority violated the Agreement by contracting out work previously
performed by Network Control Operators at the Port Authority Help Desk.
The Authority is ordered to cause a return to NCOs of the unit work of serving as
first contacts for the reporting, resolution, referral and tracking of computer problems
except for "software" problems occurring with users in the Authority's Engineering and
Law Departments.
The Authority violated the Agreement when after September 11, 2001 it
transferred to nonunit employees duties associated with the preparation and submission
of PATH and Authority payrolls, including special runs and checks and the resubmission
of abends. The Authority is ordered to cause a return of those functions to employees in
the CWA's unit.
The Authority violated the Agreement by having site prep work at the Newark
Airport performed by nonunit employees.
The Authority is ordered to cease and desist from subcontracting or otherwise
transferring such work from employees in CWA's unit. The Authority is further ordered
to grant such paid release time within the thirty day period after the Union's receipt of
this award to an employee currently serving as an officer of CWA which is reasonably
necessary to enable CWA to investigate whether and to what extent the Authority may
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have subcontracted or otherwise transferred unit work at the Newark Airport to persons
not included in CWA's unit

Dated:
Eri0\T. Schmertz
/ Arbitrator
State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
/Eric J. Schmertz

20

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 IBEW
Case #133000215902

-andTHE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY

-X

The stipulated, issue is:
Did the Employer violate Section 24 Paragraph
41 of the Memorandum of Agreement by refusing
to reimburse MICHAEL ANZALONE for the cost of
taking the course National Electric Code,
update? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 29, 2003 at which time Mr.
Anzalone,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

and

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's

the

Oath

was

waived,

a

stenographic

record

of

hearing was taken and the Employer filed a post-hearing

brief

(Union counsel made oral summation).
The relevant part of Section 24, Paragraph 41 of the
Memorandum of Agreement reads:
Trade Courses.
a.
During the term of the Agreement, the
present procedure for reimbursement of preapproved "trade related" courses, including

- . .'.". r,,'-r3\d

books

and

ma

effect and prompt payment of monies due will
be emphasized.

The grievant, an electrician, applied for approval to
take

the

course

Employer acted

National Electric

on his

application

Code, update.

Before the

for approval, the grievant

enrolled in and completed the course.

Thereafter his request for

approval was denied by Gerard Lindenmeier, the manager of airport
maintenance services at JFK Airport, and the grievant's request
for reimbursement of the cost of tuition, books and manuals was
similarly disapproved and denied.
There
related,"

nor

is
as

no
it

dispute
disputed

that
that

the
Mr.

course

Lindenmeier

official with authority to approve or disapprove.
position

is simply

and

singularly that

was

"trade
was

the

The 'Employer's

the grievant had not

received pre-approval before taking the course, thereby failing
to comply with that requirement of Section 24 of the Memorandum,
and hence made himself ineligible for reimbursement.

The Union's position is that specific approval for
this type of course was previously obtained in other applications
and hence unnecessary this time.

It asserts that once a course

is established as "trade related,.", and if such a course had beer
previously approved, that approval continues and attaches for anc
to future similar courses, making unnecessary pre-approval eacf

time such a course is taken.

And, therefore, the Employer could

not unreasonably reject reimbursement this time.
The

Union's

interpretation

Memorandum is not the way

of

I read it.

the

language

It provides

continuation of "present procedure" for pre-approval.

of

the

for the

The record

shows that the "present procedure" has been for approval to be
sought and granted

(or rejected) on a course by course basis,

each time an employee wishes to enroll in a trade related course.
And there has been no "present procedure" to afford

automatic

approval for a course, merely because similar such courses have
been previously approved.
Also, I read the Memorandum to support the Employer's
position that each application for a course must be pre-approved,
because, as the memorandum
involved for reimbursement,

explicitly states, there are costs
as well as possible

disagreements

over "trade relatedness" or course content.
Though trade-relatedness is not involved in this case,
the reimbursement question is.

It is an obvious managerial right

to consider the reimbursement

costs involved on a "course by

course" basis.
reimbursement
necessary

that

My point is however, that the question of cost,
of

those

costs

pre-approval

and

under

course
Section

content
24 be

all
sought

make
and

responded to on a case by case, course by course basis each time
a course is sought to be taken.

However, implicit in the Memorandum procedure is that
once a course is agreed to as "trade related" a request for preapproval should not be unreasonably denied by the Employer, and
if it is denied, a reasonable reason for that denial should be
given.
Section

Indeed, in my view that is the presumption and intent of
24,

with

its

emphasis

on

"prompt

payment"

of

reimbursement.
In

this

case

the

Employer's

reason

for

denying

approval is limited to its assertion that a similar course "in
house" was planned by Human

Resources, making

the grievant's

request duplicative and unnecessary.
Frankly, based on the record, I am not persuaded that
when the request for approval was denied, the Employer had in
mind, as the reason for the denial, that it intended to offer a
similar course "in house."

I believe that that reason emerged

later, after the Union grieved, and therefore it was not the
reason for the denial of approval when the denial was made.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Employer did not
give that reason to the Union, if at all, until, at the earliest,
in August 2002, some eight months after the approval request was
made, and three months after the grievance was filed.

Though the

Employer asserts that the Union or the grievant was told that

>:

V

'.

'. , :. i::'J

.-: '.

reason earlier, but verbally, the Employer's two official answers
to the grievance did not include that reason.

Instead they said

only that the grievant "failed to secure pre-approval."
Moreover,

supportive

of

this conclusion

is credible

testimony that the "in house" course was not actually scheduled
until October/November

2002.

-The extensive time lapse between

the denial of approval and notice of an "in house" course and its
scheduling,

persuades

me

that

the

reason

relied

on

by

the

Employer in this arbitration was an afterthought and not the real
reason for the denial.
Indeed,

without

the

need

to be

specific,

there is

believable testimony ascribing a totally different reason for Mr.
Lindenmeier's decision.
I find one other fact that rebuts the Employer's claim
that

the

course

unnecessary.

the

grievant

took

was

duplicative

and

For, as iu turned out, the "in house" course lasted

only eight hours, whereas the course the grievant took required
thirty

(30) hours of study.

This time difference

is evidence

that the former was not a substantive substitute for the latter,
especially so when there is no claim by the Employer that the
grievant's course was not "trade related."
The obvious

final question is the decisional

of the foregoing findings under the Memorandum language.

outcome

I have concluded

and held that for reimbursement

of

the costs, pre-approval is required on a course by course basis
each time a request to take a course is made.

But I also hold

that under the wording of the Memorandum, particularly with its
emphasis

on

"prompt

payment"

for

trade

related

courses,

Employer's approval thereof should not be unreasonably

the

withheld,

and that if disapproved, a reason(s) should be stated at the time
of disapproval.

Otherwise, denial of approval can be made for

any

no

reason

or

negotiated

reason,

Memorandum

thereby

language

and

nullifying
the

the

employee's

jointly

legitimate

rights thereunder.

violation

So

what

by

the

we

have

grievant

of

here
the

are

mutual

requirement

violations.

A

to obtain pre-

approval and a violation by the Employer of its obligation not to
deny approval unreasonably.
Under
with both

these

unique

circumstances,

parties, an equitable decision

where

fault

lies

is warranted.

The

obvious equitable remedy is for the costs of tuition books and
manuals to be shared equally, ^ by the grievant and ^ by the
Employer.
I

caution

all employees not

to construe

this

as a

license to gain H reimbursement where pre-approval has not been
obtained and it should be clear to the Employer
denial

of

sustained

approval,
only

without

because

a

reasonable

that

reason,

a bare

cannot

be

pre- approval had not been obtained.
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Also,

clearly,

this

decision

is

based

in

the

particular facts of this case and non-precedential for any future
matters.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer shall reimburse MICHAEL ANZALONE
for *2 the costs of the tuition, books and
manual for the course National Electric Code,
update.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

July 9, 2003

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.
OPINION AND AWARD

-andTHE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
And NEW JERSEY
-X

At the hearing I determined the issue to be:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance 91.03 dated October 28, 2003?
In pertinent part the foregoing Union's grievance reads:
"Violation
Benefits).

of

Section

III,

fl

(Dental

Failure to provide Benefit Level for Dental
Benefits equal to Management and Professional
Employees."

A

hearing

representatives

was

held

on

May

7,

of the above-named Union

2004,

at

which

and Employer

time

appeared

and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and

to examine

and

cross-examine

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's

oath was waived, a stenographic record of the hearing taken and
the parties filed post-hearing
Section III,

briefs.

fl of the contract reads:

"During
the term of this Memorandum
of
Agreement, the Port Authority will provide
benefit for active employee in the covered
membership and their eligible dependents,
equal to those of the group Dental Insurance
Plan in effect f c^ Port Authority managerial
and professional employees as of January 1,
1981."

In

July

professional
was

2002

dental

employees were

according

bargaining

the

the

unit

increased.

covered

employees

benefits

bargaining
continued

to

for

managerial

No comparable
unit

increase

employees.

receive

and

the

The

level of

dental benefits in effect as of January 1, 1981.
The

Union's

contractual.

case

is

equitable.

The

Employer's

case is

The Union asserts that the intent of Section III,

fl was to accord a level of dental benefits that continued parity
between

the

managerial

bargaining unit.
former was

and

professional

employees

and

And that when the level of benefits

increased

in July

2002, a corresponding

the

for the

and equal

increase should have been granted the bargaining unit.
The

Union

asserts

tuat

the

contract

provisions

were

negotiated by a bargaining team from the ranks of the employees
without the benefit of counsel, and that the Arbitrator should
put

himself

in

the

position

of

that

bargaining

recognize that the continuing purpose and objective
III, ^fl was to maintain parity.

group

and

of Section

And especially so, considering

the maintenance of parity from 1981 to 2002, although apparently
no increase was granted the managerial and professional

employees

during that time.
The

Employer

rejects

the

Union's

interpretation

of

the

contract, asserting that the language of Section III, ^]l is clear
in

fixing

the

bargaining

unit dental benefit at the January 1,

1981

level.

It

argues

that

the

contract

does

not

provide

language to maintain parity, as other Employer - union contracts
do.

It cites the following parity language present in contracts

with

several

other

unions,

which

is

absent

from

the

instant

contract with the Union.
"... in the event the Port Authority improves
the group dental insurance in effect...for
managerial employees during the term of this
Memorandum of Agreement, said improvements
will be provided to the (Association) at not
less than the most favorable terms provided
to managerial employees." (emphasis added)

The Employer argues that the Union was aware of such "flowthrough" language, but failed to seek it or obtain it in contract
negotiations.
I

understand

the

Union's

equitable

argument.

Standing

alone, the date of January 1, 1981 in Section III ^]l, could be
construed as merely a point of negotiations when parity existed,
with

the

intended

inference

that

if parity

was

broken

on a

subsequent date (here July 2002), the bargaining unit would enjoy
a comparable
would

be

increase

maintained.

as of that latter date, so that parity
Indeed,

an

equitable

award

would

oe

reasonable in my view if the evidence of "flow-through" language
by others equally affected, was absent.
While I accept the Union's argument that its bargaining team
believed that parity would obtain, there is no probative evidence

that

at

negotiations,

negotiations,

the

in

parties

1981
hereto

or

in

successive

mutually

agreed

contract

or mutually

understood that the language of Section III fl, though inartfully
drawn, was intended to maintain parity.

Indeed the evidence of

the "flow-through" language negotiated by other unions with this
Employer

is relevant here

inference.
units.

such an

The same dental benefit affected several bargaining

And

in each contract it was tied to managerial

professional employees.
language,

and tips the scale against

it

is

and/or

If the other unions provided protective

evidence

that

it

was

well

within

the

contemplation of all the union negotiators that parity could be
broken, and yet no protective language was sought or negotiated
in the contract before me, despite several contract negotiations
from 1981 to 2002.
On that basis, I must conclude that the January 1, 1981 date
was

not

just

a

date when

parity

existed,

but

rather

was

a

substantive date that fixed the level of dental benefits for the
bargaining unit, until changed by bi-lateral negotiations.
Therefore, I cannot find the language of Section III, fl to
be ambiguous or indeterminative.
Finally, it is well settled that the Arbitrator, faced with
considering

an equitable answer

to disputed

language,

and the

application of contract language that is specific, is required to
sustain the language as wr:tten even if the consequences create

an apparent inequity.

Confined to my arbitral authority to the

four corners of the contract, I find no authority to step out of
that

role,

into

the role of bargaining unit

electrician,

who

negotiated the language and "believed" its intent was different
from

its precise

terms.

Rather,

I must

leave

the matter of

parity to negotiations by ar d between the parties.

To fashioning

an equitable remedy, as tempting and as equitable as that may be,
is not within my power under the circumstances of this case.
The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the

Arbitrator,

and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance 91.03 dated October 8,
2003 is denied.

Eric J. STchmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

July 20, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ADMINISTRATOR

ASSOCIATION,
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.
Case #133000208103
-and-

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY
-X

The

above-named

Union

and

Authority

stipulate to a precisely worded issue.

were

unable

to

The Union's version of

the issue is:
Did the Port Authority violate the collective
bargaining agreement by failing to treat the
injury of John DeMild on duty time as an
exclusion within the meaning of Article 13?
If so what shall be the remedy? (emphasis
added)

The Authority's version of the issue is:
Did the Port Authority violate the collective
bargaining agreement by failing to pay John
DeMild for his IOD time or by denying him 8
sick days for his injury?
If so, in either
case, what shall be the remedy?
(emphasis
added)
A hearing was held on January 13, 2004 at which time Mr.
DeMild,

hereinafter

representatives

of

referred

the Union

to

as

the

and Authority

"grievant"
appeared

and

and were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived, a stenographic record of the hearings was taken and both
parties filed post-hearing briefs or statements.
The essential facts are not in dispute.

While working on

his job as an electrician, and while attempting to cut away a
silicone covering on an access cover, the grievant cut his hand
with the knife he was using.
by the Authority.

The knife was a tool issued to him

The injury, which required stitches, caused

him to lose eight days of work.
It is the Union's contention on the grievant's behalf, that
the injury qualified as an Injury on Duty under Article XIII of
the

collective bargaining

agreement.

The

pertinent

part of

Article XIII reads:
"In computing points, the following
are excluded....

absences

First sick absence caused
related to Injury on Duty."

directly

by

and

It is undisputed that by practice and interpretation, an
Injury on Duty

(IOD) that qualifies under the foregoing is not

charged to the employee's sick time or vacation time, but rather
for the absence the employee receives his regular pay.
The Authority denied the grievant request for pay for the
eight days he was out because, it asserts, the injury was due to
the grievant's negligence in failing to wear gloves.

It argues

that the exclusion in Article XIII is defined and conditioned on
its Information Bulletin #46, the pertinent part of which reads:
"The following are the recognized standards
to be used to determine if an employee has
suffered a IOD under our policy and is
therefore eligible to receive supplemental
payments.
...the injury did not occur due to the
negligence or misconduct on the part of the
employee...." (emphasis added)
Here,

asserts

the

Authority,

the

grievant's

negligence

precludes granting him IOD pay for the eight days he was out of
work.
For those eight days, and because the Union intervened on
the

grievant's

behalf,

the

Authority

permitted

him

to

use

accumulated vacation time so that he received pay for the time,
but lost seven or eight days vacation.1
The grievance

seeks the return of whatever

sick/vacation

time he was required to use.
I call the parties attention to the identical wording of
their

respective

statements of the

issue.

Both

refer

to a

"violation of the collective bargaining agreement" (see the

'
It is unclear whether one day was covered by one remaining day he had
in his "sick bank" or that all eight days were charged to vacation because
he had no sick time in his "bank."

foregoing emphasis)2.

It is well settled that the

authority is defined by' the stipulated issue(s).
version

mentions,

Bulletin #46.
#46

was

not

nor

incorporates

by

Arbitrator's
Here, neither

reference

Information

Undisputed is the fact that Information Bulletin
bilateral

bargained,

but

issued unilaterally by the Authority.

rather

promulgated

and

There is no evidence in

this record that the Union subsequently accepted or acquiesced in
the provisions of the Bulletin.
So,
confines

it is not unreasonable

and possibly

within the

full

of the power given me by the issue'(s) presented, to

conclude that the Bulletin is not probatively before me and that
this dispute must be determined strictly on the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
and unconditional.

If so, the contract is clear

The grievant suffered an injury and he was on

duty when it happened.

The contract places no conditions on an

injury or how it occurred.

Indeed, if the Authority wanted the

Bulletin #46 conditions contractually applicable it could have
and

should

especially
Addendum

have
since

included
Bulletin

dated April

such
#46

restrictions
is

dated

in

July

13, 1972, both dates well

the contract,
28,

1986

prior

with

to the

instant collective bargaining agreement of June 4, 2002 to June
3, 2006.

Absent such inclusion, especially when the conditions

In its brief the Authority refers to the Memorandum of Agreement. But
there is no dispute that the collective bargaining agreement and the
"Memorandum of Agreement are synonymous terms for the bilaterally negotiated
the contract.
4

of Bulletin #46 were completely known to the Authority when the
contract

was

negotiated,

the

restrictions

therein

cannot

be

imputed to or binding on the Union, or the grievant the Union
represents3.
Lest that not be a complete determination of the dispute
herein,

and

assuming

arguendo,

that

Bulletin

#46

should

be

construed as a reasonable restriction on excluding an Injury on
Duty

from sick leave, my conclusion would be the same.

that theory

the burden

is on the Authority

Under

to establish as a

matter of tort law that the grievant was negligent and would not
have suffered the injury had he worn the gloves.

The issue then

would be:
"Was the grievan^'s failure to use gloves
while using a knife to remove the silicone
around the access cover (or its screws) an
act of negligence which was the proximate
cause of his injury."
The Authority has not met the requisite burden.

It offered

no evidence of any rule or procedure that required an electrician
to use gloves

for the procedure

involved.

Though

during the

investigation the grievant apparently offered different reasons
why he did not use gloves, one, that he could not remove the
silicone and dislodge the screws if gloves were worn, is, in the
absence of any rule or prescribed procedure, plausible and not
per se a negligent act.

Of course, clearly, an employee guilty of willful self injury, not the
case here, would not be eligible for IOD pay.
5

3

More significantly, the Authority's claims of negligence is
merely an allegation and conclusion.
res ipsa loquitur
injury

could

negligence) .
way.

It seems to be asserting

(that the act speaks for itself - i.e. the

not

have

occurred

but

for

the

grievant's

Under traditional tort law, it is not seen that

There was no testimony on the details of the injury, how it

happened
gloves

and particularly why

had

been worn.

For

it would

not

have

happened if

it is well within the realm of

reasonable possibility that the force of the knife, the angle it
struck the hand, the direction of its thrust', the glove could
have

been

penetrated

nonetheless.

and

the

injury

to

the

Indeed there was no definitive

protective texture of the glove.

hand

resulted

testimony on the

In short, the Authority has not

proved that the injury would not have occurred had the grievant
worn gloves.
protected

him

This is not to say that the glove would not have
from

injury.

Rather

it

is

to

say

that

the

requisite proof that wearing the glove was both required and that
it would have prevented the injury, has not been satisfied.
Accordingly,

for both the above

reasons,

the grievant's

injury qualified as an Injury on Duty under Article XIII of the
contract.

The seven or eight days he was out should not have

been charged to the grievant's sick or vacation entitlement.
time he was so charged shall be restored to him.

The

The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the

Arbitrator

and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Under Article XIII of the contract, John
DeMild qualified for Injury on Duty pay. The
time charged against his sick and/or vacation
entitlements shall be restored to him.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

March 26, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

SS :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

the requirement
second

of a contract

sentence

of

Article

change
XV

<J[9

or amendment.
remains

So, the

applicable

and

determinative.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's complaint
that the Employer
breached the contract by disallowing the
banking of overtime on a daily basis, and
requiring instead that it be banked on a
weekly basis, is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

July 21, 2003

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 IBEW
Case #133000114103
-and-

DAILY NEWS

-X

There are three issues,

(two agreed to and one with

different proposals).
The agreed to issues are:
1.

Was the suspension of GERARD BAIO
just cause?

for

2.

Was the suspension of JAMES COLUCCIO for
just cause?

The third issue, as stated by the Union is:
3.

Did Baio's shift
seniority clause?

change

breach

the.

The Employer's version of the third issue is:
Did Baio's shift change violate
collective bargaining agreement?
As to all three issues,

the parties

the

agree that the

Arbitrator has remedial authority.
A hearing was held on August
Messrs.

Baio

and

Coluccio,

hereinafter

6, 2003 at which time
referred

to

as

"grievants" and representatives of the above-named Union and

the

So, the instant suspensions were proper as the next, logical step
in a traditional "progressive discipline" procedure.
What
involuntarily

the

Employer

transfer

Baio

did

to

wrong,

a different

Employer did so, understandingly,

however,
work

cannot

agreement.

be

to separate the two of them,

under

the

collective

But the
bargaining

But it is clear to me that it was

for both

Under the contract the remedies for misconduct are the

imposition of discipline, in the .form of warnings,
and discharge.

the

suspensions

Those remedies are and should be fully adeguate

to address misconduct,
working

The

The Employer asserts it was for operational reasons,

not discipline.
reasons.

sustained

to

shift.

because it believed they "fed each others misconduct."
transfer

was

same

including misconduct "fed" by employees

shift -

especially the ultimate penalty of

discharge.
But,
unless

as

long

as

an

employee

remains

employed,

and

agreed to otherwise by his representative Union, he is

entitled to his contract rights and benefits.

Here, based on his

seniority and his rights under Article XVI of the contract, Baio
is entitled

to the shift of his

selection.

To transfer

him

involuntarily to a different shift, whether for disciplinary or
operational reasons, is violative of his seniority right
Article XVI.

under

Indeed, Section 1 of Article XVI states, inter alia,
without exception:
"Seniority
shifts..."

shall

apply

only

to

choice

of

Therefore, the involuntary change in Baio's shift was
improper and is reversed.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The suspensions of GERARD BAIO and JAMES
COLUCCIO were for just cause.
The transfer of BAIO to a different shift is
reversed. He shall be restored to his
previous shift.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

August 28, 2003

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

230 PARK AVENUE, SUITE 416
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10169
(212)687-8200
FAX: (212)697-2521
Email: schmertz@dwecklaw.com

THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD OF BOARD OF
ARBITRATION

OPERATIVEPLASTERERS' LOCAL 530
-andDRYWALL TAPERS & JOINERS LOCAL 1974
_________________________________________________________________________ X
In a previous decision in this matter, the Board of Arbitration ruled that the dispute over the skim coating
work performed at 60 Wall Street, New York City, was arbitrable.
At the subsequent hearing on November 20, 2003, on the merits of the dispute, Local 1974 expressly
chose not to appear though it received due notice of the scheduled hearing. Representatives of the Plasters' Local
530 appeared. The Board of Arbitration ruled that the hearing proceed and the proofs and allegations of Local
530 were heard.
Based on the evidence, testimony and argument of Local 530, and in the absence of contrary evidence
from Local 1974, but particularly based on Decision 191-2a in the Green Book, and other relevant cited
arbitration decisions, to which the Board of Arbitration is bound by the terms of the New York Plan for
Resolution of Jurisdictional Disputes, the Level 5 and skim coating work performed at 60 Wall Street is the work
of the Plasterers and should have been assigned to the Plasterers.
The Board of Arbitration, limited to deciding which Union has jurisdiction over the work in dispute and
confined in its power to the terms of the New York Plan, does not have the authority to issue a prospective "cease
and desist" order, as requested by Local 530, nor does it have jurisdiction over the application of the Court rulings
cited, by letter, by Local 1974.
Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED: November 25, 2003
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

West Side Office
TRUMP PLACE
160 Riverside Boulevard - 19C
New York, New York 10023
914393-3555

230 PARK AVENUE, SUITE 416
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10169
(212) 687-8200
FAX: (212)697-2521
Email: schmertz@dwecklaw.com

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD OF BOARD OF
ARBITRATION

IBEWLOCAL3

-andGLAZIERS LOCAL 1281

-X
The photovoltaic cells installed at the Whitehall Ferry Terminal, consisting of glass panels in a "field
glazed curtain type system" is the work of the glaziers.
The wiring of electrical connection of the system remains the work of the electricians.

EricJ/Schmertz, Arbitrat
DATED: November 19, 2003
STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I am the individual described
in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
'-fe-

west Side Office
TRUMP PLACE
160 Riverside Boulevard - 19C
New York, New York 10023
914 393-3555

-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
METAL TRADES COUNCIL OF NEW LONDON
COUNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
LODGE WgSE 1871

OPINION AND AWARD

-andELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
-X

The stipulated issue is:
"Is
the
timely?"

grievance

of

STEPHEN

FRECHETTE

However, as the above parties also litigated the merits
of the grievance, I deem that the issue is also:
"If the grievance is arbitrable is Mr.
Frechette entitled to the vacation and sick
time pay benefits set forth in the Memorandum
of Agreement dated October 31, 2000?"
A

hearing

was

held

on

February

6,

2003

in Groton

Connecticut at which time Mr. Frechette, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union
and

Company

opportunity

appeared.

concerned

were

to offer evidence and argument

cross-examine witnesses.
stenographic

All

The Arbitrator's

afforded

full

and to examine and
Oath was waived, a

record of the proceedings was taken and both sides

filed post-hearing briefs.
At the expiration of a leave of absence in 1981, the
grievant did not return to work.

On May 4, the Conrvoany sent him a letter by registered
mail, which stated inter alia:

I

"This letter is to officially notify you that
effective Thursday, May 4, 1989 you have been
terminated for failure to report to work,
and/or failure to notify your Department or
Labor Relations with a reasonable excuse for
your absence..."
The grievant acknowledged receipt of that letter.
Thereafter on May 16, 1989 the grievant

was sent a

letter setting forth benefits to which he was entitled "upon
termination of employment."

There is no dispute that he received

that letter.
The

grievant's

"termination"

was

recorded

by

the

Company in an Employee Severance form, dated May 4, 1989.
On July 26, 1989 the Company advised the grievant by
letter that he was
retirement benefits."
withholding

"eligible for a lump sum payment
In response, he completed

of your

an attached

tax form checking the option to "withhold taxes."

There is no dispute that he received that retirement benefit.
Thereafter the Company heard nothing from the grievant
regarding the action it took to "terminate (him) for failure to
report to work and/O£_J!ailure to notify (his) Department or Labor
Relations...."

Sometime
grievant

in 2001

(some

12 or

"was rehired by the Company"

13 years

later) the

(apparently as an Outside

Machinist, the classification he previously held).
Earlier, however, on October 31, 2000, the Union and
the Company negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding

which, in

pertinent part, provides:
"The Company and the Union agree to the
following vacation and sick leave accrual for
Union represented employees:
c.

Employees
voluntarily
resigning
from
employment on or after January 1, 1976
who were or will be subsequently rehired
will be credited for service accumulated
prior to such resignation if and when
they
complete one year
of
service
subsequent to rehire. (emphasis added)

Employees affected by these new provisions
will receive enhanced vacation hours/pay and
sick time pay accruals as well as prorated
sick time hours, if applicable on January 1,
2001.
In no event will any employee be
credited for time out prior to July 1,
1968..."
The grievant and the Union on his behalf claim that he
qualifies under the foregoing provisions and is entitled to the
enhanced vacation and sick leave benefits referred to therein.

In pertinent part, the grievance

(undated), but with

an answer from the Company dated November 12, 2002, reads:
"...Local
Lodge
1871 contends
that the
Company failed to credit S. Frechette with
the proper vacation and sick entitlements..."
The Company asserts that the grievance is untimely and
not

arbitrable

because it was not

filed

working days from the date of knowledge

"within

twenty

(20)

of the occurrence or

knowledge of the failure of the occurrence, whichever may be the
case, of the

incident upon

which the grievance

is based..."

(Article VI, Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement.")
It
dramatically

points

out

in excess

that

13

of 20 working

years,
days,

elapsed

from the

grievant's "termination" to the filing of the grievance.
the

entitlement

under

the

Memorandum

requires

a

And as

"voluntary

resignation" not a "termination," his grievance, which after 13
years protests his "termination," is time barred by Article VI.
And further, as his "termination" was not a "voluntary
resignation" his is factually ineligible for the benefits.
Under

the particular

circumstances

of this case, I

find the grievance procedu^ally arbitrable, but, as explained
later, lacking in merit.
A challenge to the Company's action "terminating" the
grievant for failing to return to work after his leave of absence

would be unquestionably untimely and not arbitrable.
notice

of

the

Company's

action

terminating

him

He had full
and

did

not

protest it within the prescribed time under Article VI.
However, I interpret the grievance differently -- not
as a challenge to how his employment ended, but rather to the
denial
Indeed,

of

the

enhanced benefits

the written grievance

under

1(C

of

the

so states, namely

Memorandum.
charging

the

Company with "failure, to credit S. Frechette with the proper
vacation and sick entitlements."

That denial occurred when the

grievant had completed one year of service following his rehire.
At that point, his claim for the entitlement became "perfected"
and at that point, not before, the denial by the Company became
actionable.
That he may have been advised, earlier, after rehire,
that his eligibility under the Memorandum depended on the reasons
for the end of his earlier employment

it was not yet then a

denial of his claim for the benefits.

It required the actual

denial

and not before,

grievable.

for the Company's position

On that basis, I find nothing

to become

in the record which

supports a claim that the grievance "was jnot^jiresented _-withia_,_20
working

days"

of

the

denial

of

the

grievance, so interpreted, is arbitrable.

benefits.

Hence,

the

On the merits, the issue is whether the grievant was
"terminated for failure to return to work" or "quit" his job
prior to the Company's action terminating him.
More particularly, in my view, it is whether, if I
credit his testimony and that of foreman Belli, the grievant's
actions qualify not only as a "quit" but rather as a "voluntary
resignation" within the meaning and intent of the Memorandum.
Even

crediting

what

he

told

Belli,

and

there

is

evidence casting doubt on his version, I cannot conclude that the
grievant perfected his
"voluntary

"quit" to raise it to the impact of a

resignation"

within

the

provisions

of

^C

of

the

Memorandum.
What the grievant and Belli did was not sufficiently
effective or procedurally complete to give adequate notice to the
Company that the grievant was abandoning his employment.
the grievant's friend

Belli,

who formerly supervised him was not then

in the grievant's "chain of command."

Belli could not testify

that he transmitted any information to the grievant's department,
to

labor

officials

relations, human
of

the

Company

resources

or personnel.

responsible

for

So, the

personnel

and

operational matters had no knowledge of the grievant's alleged
intention to quit.

Belle's written note reciting the substances

of his talk with the grievant was not prepared contemporaneously

with the event, but not until 2002, apparently in preparation for
this grievance.

The grievant admits that Belli told him "to

cycle out" -- i.e. to turn in his badge and to notify the proper
Company officials of his intentions.
So,

again,

the Company

The grievant did not do so.

had no information of the grievant's

plans, even assuring what he told Belli.
Most

significant

to

my

mind

is

that

the

grievant

failed to object to the letters from the Company, all founded on
his termination for failure to return to work.

His failure to do

so creates a presumption that the Company acted accurately and
shifts the burden to the grievant and this Union on his behalf to
rebut that presumption.
The presumption

has not been

rebutted.

I am not

persuaded that the grievant should be excused from protesting or
correcting the Company's action because, as he testified, he "had
already quit -- and the letters were just mail."
For the grievant who acknowledged

that he wanted to

keep a "clear record" of employment and who also acknowledged
that he considered

the possibility of later returning

to the

Company's employ, it is abnormal not to complain or attempt to
correct his official termination for failure to return to work,
as simply untrue.

Frankly,

I believe

that

the

grievant's

contacting Belli was more '^o recover his

purpose

in

tools without going

through the normal procedure to do so, then to give notice he was
quitting.
In short, even if what the grievant told Belli could
be generally construed as a "quit" I am not persuaded, on an
evidentiary basis, that it rebuts or overturns the presumption or
the reasonableness of the Company's conclusion that the grievant
simply neglected to return to work.

Especially so, when for some

12 or 13 years the grievant did not object, challenge or attempt
to correct the notices to him that he was terminated for failure
to return to work.
There is more that I conclude supports the Company's
case.

It is the wording of the Memorandum, particularly the

phrase "voluntarily resigning."

While generally true in labor

relations a "quit" "job abandonment" and "resignation" may have a
synonomousness.

But I do not think so in this case.

negotiated

words

the

"voluntarily

"quit" or "job abandonment."
the

enhanced

vacation

and

"resigning"

The parties

not

the

words

My view of that fact is that for
sick

leave

benefits,

the

rehired

employee had to have previously left the Company under a special
institutional

procedure,

namely

"resigning

voluntarily."

To

"resign" in that context requires clear and unconditional notice

8

to

those

departments

and

persons

at

the

Company

who

are

responsible for operational and personnel procedures and records.
The choice of the language "voluntarily resigning" ensures that
kind of official notice, either in writing or verbally, but also
eliminates or reduces the ambiguities that may well be associated
with a "quit" and "job abandonment."
to

various

"voluntary

factual

circumstances

resignation"

The latter two are subject
and

interpretation,

but

a

with its formality and precision, does

not.
The Belli and grievant talk is laden not only with
evidentiary

problems

but also with the very

"voluntarily resigning" avoids.

ambiguities that

So, the evidence in support of

the grievance does not meet a requisite burden of proof to show
that what
within

the grievant

the

meaning

did here was

and

intent

of

fc

to
of

"voluntarily
the

resign"

Memorandum

of

Agreement.
The Undersigned,

duly

designated

as the Arbitrator,

and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, make the following AWARD:
1.

The grievance on behalf of STEPHEN
FRECHETTE, contending that the Company
failed to credit him with the proper
vacation
and
sick
entitlements
is
arbitrable.

2.

Said grievance is denied on the merits.
The Company did not violate the contract
or the Memorandum
of Agreement
of
October
31,
2000
by
denying
Mr.
Frechette
his
claim
for
enhanced
vacation
hours
and
sick
time
pay
accruals.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

May 28, 2003

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
SS :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
DAVID A. PONTBRIAND

OPINION AND AWARD

-andELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
-X

In

accordance with

the Company's

Dispute Resolution

Procedure, the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
"Did the Electric Boat Corporation violate
any
legally
recognized
rights
of
David
Pontbriand when it withdrew its conditional
employment offer on November 6, 2002? If so,
what shall be the proper remedy?
A

hearing was

held

on January

23, 2004

in Groton,

Connecticut, at which time Mr. Pontbriand and representatives of
the Electric Boat Corporation
opportunity

to offer evidence and argument.

Oath was waived,
taken.

appeared and were afforded

and a stenographic

full

The Arbitrator's

record of the hearing was

The Company filed a post-hearing brief.

Mr. Pontbriand

submitted a post-hearing letter.
The
Pontbriand,

essential

hereinafter

facts
referred

are
to

not

in

as

the

dispute.

Mr.

"Claimant,"

was

employed by Electric Boat Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company" as an Outside Machinist from 1984 until laid off in
1997.

Just prior to his layoff he reported a physical problem

that was subsequently

diagnosed by a neurologist

as "bilateral

carpal tunnel syndrome," with a 10% permanent disability.
Based

on a Workers'

Compensation

claim

and

for

the

permanent disability found, the Claimant received and accepted a
full and

final settlement

in the. amount

lawyer received an additional

of $61,863.87.

fee in the amount of $9,279.58).

That settlement was reached on November 26, 2997.
June

1998

the Claimant

(His

was diaghosed with

Thereafter in

shoulder

injuries,

which were assigned a 15% disability rating for each shoulder by
an orthopedist.

It is undisputed that the medical authorities

who diagnosed and treated the Claimant

found the carpal

tunnel

syndrome and the shoulder disabilities to be a result of the use
of certain vibrating tools and equipment that are a regular part
of the job duties of an Outside Machinist.
In August of 2002 the Claimant sought reemployment with
the Company as an Outside Machinist.

He was made a "conditional

offer of employment," subject to passing a physical examination.
That physical

examination

cited.

Company's

The

disclosed the continued
medical

Director

disabilities

concluded

that

the

Claimant's disabilities would be worsened if he was again to use
the required

vibrating

tools of the Outside Machinist's

job.

Because that restriction would disqualify him for reemployiaent,
his

case

was

referred

to the Company's Accommodation

Committee, to see if any job duty accommodation could be
1

Review

arranged which

would

permit his

reemployment.

The Committee

found that no accommodation was possible, as the use of vibrating
tools and repetitive hand motions were essential duties of an
Outside Machinist.

The

conditional

offer

of

employment

was

withdraw and the Claimant's application of employment was denied.
The Claimant makes two arguments.

He asserts that the

Workers' Compensation settlement resulted from the forgery of his
signature on the legal papers involved, without his consent or
knowledge.

And that other employees of the Company with similar

disabilities and/or compensation settlements are employed or were
re-employed, and that therefore the denial of his

reemployment

application was discriminatory.
Though

the

Company

points

out

that

the

Claimant's

physical disabilities do not fall within nor are covered by the
Americans

with

Compensation

Disability

Act

or

Act,

the

the

Longshore

Connecticut
and

Harbor

Workers'
Workers'

Compensation Act, the Claimant did not make his claim under any
of those statutes.
correct

in

So, while it appears that the Company

asserting

the non-applicability

of

those

is

Acts,

a

determination thereof is not necessary, as they are not the basis
for the Claimant's case herein.
Also unnecessary

for determination is the Claimant's

charge that his lawyer acted wrongly in settling the
Compensation case.

Workers'

The fact is that.the Claimant accepted the
3

monetary settlement, thereby affirming the settlement.
that

settlement

arbitration.

is

not

a

determinative

Moreover,

factor

in

The critical question is the Claimant's

this

physical

condition and whether it reasonably precluded his return to a job
that

required

the

use

of

the

very

tools

that

caused

the

disabilities in the first place.
The

only

medical

evidence

in

the

record

is

the

testimony of the Company's physician who stated that a resumption
of the use of vibrating tools and other required hand movements
would aggravate the Claimant's condition.
further injurious to him.

And that that would be

Also undisputed is the Accommodation

Committee decision that the Outside Machinist job could not be
performed without use of the offending tools.
Therefore,
testimony

and

Accommodation

the

based

on

apparently

Committee,

I

the
good

cannot

uncontraverted
faith
find

decision

that

the

medical
of

the

Company's

decision not to re-hire the Claimant was arbitrary, unreasonable
or otherwise illegal.
What might

have made

a difference

would

have been

evidence of the Claimant' s assertion that the Company employed or
re-employed persons with the same or similar disabilities as he.
Evidence of that, as fact, could raise the "legal" argument of
discrimination.

Arbitrators- recognize that disparate treatment

of employees similarly situated may be illegal discrimination in
an arbitral sense and actionable for remedy.
Unfortunately,

here,

the

Claimant

only

made

the

argument, but offered no examples or other proofs in support of
that

assertion.

Even

when

the

Arbitrator

explained

the

importance and relevance of such evidence, the Claimant expressly
declined
tands

to

provide

any

unsubstantiated

specifics.

and

cannot

Therefore
be

his

assertion

as

probative

credited

evidence.
For all the foregoing reasons the Claimant' s appeal to
arbitration must be denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in
the

above

matter,

and

having

duly

heard

the

proofs

and

allegations of the parties hereto makes the following AWARD:
The Electric Boat Corporation did not violate
any

legally

Pontbriand

recognized

when

rights

it withdrew

its

of

David

conditional

offer of employment ..on November 6, 2002.

Eric A. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

March 15, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath a
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION and CONCILIATION SERVICE
ADMINISTRATOR
.

\

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS/2741

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE # 04-54027

-and-

ALSTON\, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did
the
Company
violate the
collective
bargaining agreement by not shutting down the
plant at Thanksgiving and Christmas 2003? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company's offices in Hornell, New
York on August
above-named

4, 2004, at which

Union

and

Company

time representatives of the

appeared.

All

concerned

were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was

waived.
The Union

asserts that based on the contract and a past

practice (which became an implied contract provision) the Company
was obligated to shut down during the weeks in which Thanksgiving
and

Christmas

fell

in

2003.

And,

additionally,

because

the

Company did not respond to the Union's grievance protesting the
cancellation

of the aforesaid shut downs within the contractual

time limit, the grievance was granted and must be sustained.

Let me deal with the last point first
of response to the grievance).
particularly

(i.e. the timeliness

Relevant thereto is Article 29,

Step One of the grievance procedure and Section 4.

Respectively, the pertinent parts thereof read:
"...the grievance will be investigated and an
answer given to the grieving Party within
five (5) working days after receipt of the
grievance.
"The time limits specified in any step of the
Grievance Procedure may be extended by mutual
agreement of the Parties.
...if the Company fails to comply with the
time limits the grievance shall be granted
with
appropriate
relief...."
(emphasis
added)
It is undisputed that the Company did not respond to the
grievance within the time limits required under Step One of the
grievance procedure.
because,

as

discussions
that

a

Union

in extensive

in an effort to settle the grievance.

And argues,

those

waiver

of

The Company explains that it did not do so

substitute,

acknowledged
the

response

it

engaged

the

settlement

discussions

time

or

limit

at

constituted

least

a

constructive

compliance therewith.
Confined
compelled

to

to

the

negotiated

disagree.

The

terms

contract

of

the

makes

contract,
the

time

I am
limits

mandatory by providing for the granting of the grievance if the
time limits at any step are not followed.

The contract goes on

to

expressly

of

only

by

mutual

provide
agreement.

for extensions

the

time

limits

It does not provide for a waiver

oecause of settlement

discussions.

Indeed

it is well

settled

arbitral law that settlement discussions do not toll mandatory
time limits.

and that such discussions and compliance with time

limits

as

that,

here,

mutually inconsistent.

are

statutes

of

limitation,

are

not

Indeed, for example, if the Union had not

filed its grievance for arbitration within the five

(5) working

days time limit of Step Three of the grievance procedure because
settlement discussions were underway, the Company would have been
justified

and

correct

in asserting

that

the grievance

longer arbitrable on the grounds that the "grievance

was no
(was) be

closed" as provided in Step Four.
Reciprocally, therefore, in the absence of a mutually agreed
to

extension

of

the

response

time

limit

in

Step

One,

the

arbitrator is bound to enforce the negotiated consequence, namely
that the Union's grievance is deemed granted.
Under that finding and circumstance the contract requires an
"appropriate

relief."

Clearly,

because

Thanksgiving

and

Christmas weeks of the year 2003 have passed, a retractive remedy
or relief is impossible.

But an "appropriate

contractually

Therefore,

mandated.

shall be equitable.

the

relief" is still

"appropriate

relief"

I shall order that the Company shut down for

Thanksgiving and Christmas in the year 2004, on the same basis
and the same conditions it shut down in previous years.

However,

the

Union's

request

for

an

order

requiring the

ompany to shut down similarly in the succeeding years of the
current contract is denied.

On the merits I reject the Union's

claim that by past practice

(i.e. the years of 1999, 2000, 2001,

2002 when the Company did shut down) a yearly shut down during
the

Thanksgiving

and

Christmas

weeks

became

a

part

of

the

contract.
The

contract is silent on Thanksgiving

downs.

or Christmas

shut

Based on the evidence before me, I conclude that each

shut down was

implemented

each year, by the joint act of the

parties, applicable to that particular year and not contractually
precedential for a future year.

Most significant to my mind is

the fact that each year, the Union selected one floating holiday
and the Company selected one floating holiday, in structuring the
shut down periods

surrounding Thanksgiving

and Christmas.

In

prior years, those selections, made each year, were made in such
a manner
downs.
the

as to allow

shut

But not only were they made each year, I find nothing in

contract

holiday

for the Thanksgiving and Christmas

which

which

required

would,

the Company

together

with

to

the

select

a floating

Union's

selection,

structure a shut down at Thanksgiving and Christmas.

That the

Company did so in prior years, under the yearly selection process

described,
year.

did not create a binding precedent for a successor

Indeed, considering the process described,

I am satisfied

that the Company retained and reserved each year, its "full and
exclusive authority and responsibility for the management of its
operations"

(Article 3 of the contract) .

Finally, the Company has shown a bonafide need for the nonshut downs of 2003.
orders

and

uninterrupted

Its financial condition was precarious, Work

deliveries

were

productively

overdue

was

or

needed.

behind
The

difficulties of the Company are undisputed.

schedule
then

and

financial

And, statistically,

some important though not determinative productivity was realized
during the 2003 Thanksgiving and Christmas weeks.
The

Undersigned,

duly

designated

as

the

Arbitrator, and

having- duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance is granted in part and
denied in part.
The Company is directed to shut down during
the weeks of Thanksgiving and Christmas 2004
on the same basis and the same conditions as
it shut down in prior years.
Thereafter, for the balance of the collective
bargaining
agreement, the Company is not
required to shut down during the weeks of
Thanksgiving and Christmas.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

August 19, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
JURISDICTION DISPUTES
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION OF
THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
OPINION AND AWARD
IN FAVOR OF THE
IRON WORKERS
LOCAL 361

between
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 361
-and-

BOILERMAKERS NO. 5
v

The work in dispute is:
The unloading, handling and erection of a
wind wall around the perimeter of the
Polletti power plant
A hearing was held on February 18, 2004 at which time
representatives of the above-named Union appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The Undersigned served as Chairman of the
Arbitration Board, joined by Messrs. Robert
Ansbro, J. Bidosky, III, Sam Mirian,"and
Anthony Pasqualini as members.
Appearances:
For Iron Workers Local 361:
Bill Tweet and Dick 0'Kane
For Boilermakers No. 5.:
Jerry Connolly and Mark Vandiver
The parameters of the jurisdiction and authority of the
Board of Arbitration is set forth in Section 3(i) of The New
York Plan for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes.
(i) The arbitration panel shall be bound by
Green Book decision or GCA decision where
applicable, or where there are none,

It reads:

International Agreements of record between
the trades.

If none of these apply for any

reason, including but not limited to
reasons related to technological

advances

in the industry, the arbitration panel
shall consider the established trade
practice and the prevailing practice in the
Greater New York geographical area.
Based on the evidence submitted the Board does not find
controlling case precedents in the Green Book, nor
International Agreements on point (The GCA standard is not
applicable in this proceeding).

Though there are cited cases

and Agreements on jurisdictional matters between these two
Unions, none appear to involve a wind wall around the perimeter
of not just a power plant, but a power plant containing or
engulfing an air-cooled condenser.

Also, the evidence on the

trade practices in the Greater New York geographical area is
mixed, with some relevant assignments to the Boilermakers and
others to the Iron Workers.

Hence, these "practices" are

indeterminative.
In short, we find the case before us to be one of "first
impression."
There is little dispute over the purpose and function of
the wind wall.

In simple terms it is to prevent aberrant gusts

of winds and cross-winds from reaching the condenser or the
fans of the condensers.
Rather it is designed to direct and regulate the flow of
air in particular ways for the most efficient operation and use
of the condenser.

Indeed, in the absence of the wind wall, the

efficiency of the condenser would be sharply reduced, if not
-2-

impeded.

Also, the wind wall serves to protect workers aloft

(on the structure) from dangerous wind gusts and currents.
The Boilermakers assert the foregoing operational purposes
and functions of the wind wall make the wall an integral and
essential part of the condenser.

And that therefore, because

work involving the condenser is the acknowledged work of
Boilermakers, the wind wall is Boilermakers' work too.
The Iron Workers see the wind wall as an integral part of
the metal and iron structure of the power plan.

Regardless of

its purpose, it is a metal enclosure, located as part of the
outer skin of the structure, as a facade thereof, and nothing
more than part of the overall iron structure of the power
plant.

And as the iron and steel skeleton structure of the

power house itself is the acknowledged work of the Iron Workers
(and possibly in some cases partially the work of the
Sheetmetal Workers - a matter not before us) the installation
of the instant wall is work that belongs to the Iron Workers.
As the Board sees it, critical to a determination is the
fact that work on the condenser itself is not solely within the
jurisdiction of the Boilermakers.

For example, there is no

dispute that the handling and installation of A frames, which
are unquestionably part of the condenser, is the work of the
Steamfitters Union (because the A frames contain steam pipes).
So, the handling and installation of the integral
components of the condenser have, jurisdictionally, been mixed
between, at least the Boilermakers and the Steamfitters.
Significant also, to our minds, is that the "louvers,"
located just below the wall itself, and which also play a
significant part in directing wind to the fans and condenser,

-3-

have been installed on a similar cited structure to the one
before us, by the Iron Workers, without challenge or objection
by the Boilermakers.
Moreover, the evidence discloses that the Boilermakers
perform no design or structural work on the wind wall, but
simply claim the right to install it.

If there is any unique

design to the wall, either as to size, component parts, or
contour, all that is done beforehand by the manufacturer of the
wall, and delivered pre-designed to the job site for handling,
installation and erection.

So, neither contesting Union

performs any custom work on the wall, but rather installs it as
it has been made by the manufacture.

That it is so delivered

by the manufacture of the condenser (as are the A frames) is
insufficient to make it so integral to the condenser itself as
to impute or grant legal jurisdiction to the Boilermakers.
Finally and for the same reasons, the work of handling,
installation and erection of the wind wall appears to be the
same, regardless of the type or nature of the condenser located
internally and the same even if there be no condenser at all .
For the foregoing reasons the Board has concluded that the
wind wall is more closely related to the iron and metal
structure of the building housing the condenser, then an
integral part or component of the condenser itself.
For that reason, the disputed work belongs to and should
be assigned to the Iron Workers.

feric J./l3chmertz, Chai

DATED:

February 23, 2004

-4-

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

SS :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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NEW YORK PLAN FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 361/40

OPINION AND AWARD

-and-

CARPENTERS LOCAL 926
______

__„___

_,

—

— _ _-

,__ _
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This jurisdictional dispute between the above-named Unions
is

over

the

unloading,

setting

and

bolting

channels, angles and grating made of polymer

of

"I"

beams,

(plastic)

at the

Spring Creek water pollution plant in Brooklyn, New York.
A hearing was duly held on October 28, 2004 at the offices
of the Building Trades Employer's Association
Representatives

of

the

above-named

Unions

in New York City.
appeared

and

were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine
consisted

and
of

cross-examine
the

witnesses.

Undersigned

as

The

Chairman

Arbitration
and

Messrs.

Panel
Jake

Bidosky, John Cavanagh, Kenneth Durr, and Alfred Gerosa, Members
Under the New York Plan, and as the above Unions were expressly
advised at the outset of the hearing, in making its decision the
Panel is bound to the following criteria:
1.

International
Agreements
of
between the trades involved
dispute of record;

Record
in the

2.

Previous Green Book decisions; and

3.

Both

If none of these apply for any reason,
including but not limited to reasons
related to technological advances in the
industry - the Arbitration Panel shall
consider the established trade practice
and the prevailing practice in the
Greater New York Area.

of the

above-named

Unions

agree that

International

Agreements

of Record

Both

or

"established

rely

on

assert

nor

there are no

Green Book

decisions.

trade practices

and the

prevailing practice in the Greater New York Area."
The polymer

or plastic material

being

used

in

the work

involved in this dispute is a contemporary replacement for what
previously were steel or iron beams and components.

Physically

it is as durable as steel; much lighter in weight and therefore
easier to handle and erect; and is not subject to corrosion.
The Iron Workers claim that the use of polymer or plastic
beams,

grading

and

other

above-named

components

is

a

technological evolution from the earlier use of steel or iron;
that the beams and grading resemble in appearance the physical
makeup of the predecessor steel and iron parts; are being used
now on bridges, railways and other structures, and as here, at
water

pollution plants

in the

same manner

and

for the

purposes as steel and iron..
Neither Union submitted as evidence to be considered, any decision of
the National Plan for Resolution of Jurisdictional Disputes.

same

In

short,

gratings

and

the
other

structural material
technological

Iron

Workers

components
replacing

contend

are

the

that
next

these

beams,

generation

steel and iron and hence,

of

as a

development should remain within the Iron Workers

jurisdiction.
The Carpenters argue that because the beams, grading and
other

stated

components

are

not

plastic, they are more like wood.
was the principal

steel

or

iron,

rather

And as was the case when wood

structural component in construction, should

revert to or fall within the Carpenter's jurisdiction.
Carpenters point

but

Also, the

out that the plastic nature of the products

makes them so light and easily handled, with carpenter tools, as
to make unnecessary the use of lifts or hoists.

And because the

')
beams and grading are "married or connected to, or placed on top
of concrete foundations, the installation work is precisely what
carpenters

do,

and

therefore

belongs

in

the

Carpenter' s

jurisdiction.
What
Plan

is

is determinative
the

"established

under the binding
trade

practice

criteria

and

the

of the

prevailing

practice in the Greater New York Area."
Moreover, also relevant is the criteria of
advances in the industry."

"technological

On these criteria, the Panel Concludes that construction
with polymer is a "technological

advance in the industry"

that the Iron Workers have presented a preponderance

and

of evidence

stablishing a trade practice in the Greater New York Area of
performance of that work by the Iron Workers.
The

Iron Workers

have adduced probative evidence

showing

that the same contractor who is doing the work at Spring Creek,
did the same type of work on a water pollution plan at Hunts
Point where the work was performed by Iron Workers.
Iron Workers
handled

have

adduced

the products

airtrain;

Manhattan

Whitestone Bridge.

evidence

showing

Also, the

that Iron

Workers

in question on such projects as the JFK
Bridge

rehabilitation

and

the

Bronx-

More significant, the Iron Workers adduced

evidence of work similar

to the instant dispute on some eight

water pollution plants in the Greater New York Area (in Brooklyn,
Queens, Yonkers, Wards Island, Bay Park, Staten Island as well as
Hunts Point).
The Carpenters have not offered sufficient evidence to show
a trade practice in the Greater New York Area.

It presented

evidence of this type of work performed by carpenters in Florida,
Nevada, and Maine.

And in New York, at Poughkeepsie (outside of

the Greater New York Area).

The only project in the Greater New

York Area on which the carpenters were assigned the

disputed

work are the instant job at Spring Creek and one in Nassau County
(Newtown Creek).

Standing alone, these two do not establish a

prevailing trade practice nor rebut the overwhelming

contrary

evidence by the Iron Workers.
Accordingly, it is the decision of the Panel that the work
of unloading, setting and bolting "I" beams, channels, angles and
grating made of polymer at the Spring Creek water pollution plant
in

Brooklyn,

New

York

belongs

to

the

Iron

Workers

(Locals

361/40).

Eric J./Schmertz, Chairman

DATED:

November 5, 2004

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

1^ Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

